A mint exploit produced roughly 836.9 million FEED in fourteen hours. The chikn team moved the same amount to a dead address thirty-six hours later and shut every mint path permanently. It reconciles to 55.69 FEED. This page exists because that is a credit to them, and because a token that claims to be finite should show its work.
They did not burn it — they sent it somewhere provably unreachable, which is the stronger move. A burn destroys the evidence along with the tokens. This balance is still sitting at 0x…dEaD where anyone can watch it, forever, and confirm for themselves that it has never moved.
FEED has two mint paths. One emits a Minted event. The other — swapEggForFeed — does not:
function swapEggForFeed(uint256 eggAmt) external {
...
_mint(msg.sender, eggAmt * FEED_SWAP_FACTOR); // no Minted event
emit EggSwap(msg.sender, eggAmt * FEED_SWAP_FACTOR);
}Audit supply by summing Minted and this path is invisible. It is also exactly why FEED_SWAP_FACTOR is the parameter that was set to zero afterwards.
Because this was a transfer and not a burn, totalSupply did not change. That is the tell, and it is the thing you can verify without trusting this page. Read totalSupply() either side of block … and you get the same number, while 836,870,477 FEED moved to 0x…dEaD.
Those tokens are still counted inside totalSupply today. They are unreachable, not destroyed — which is why this site reports supply two ways: what exists, and what can still move.
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Three parameters were set to zero. _mintFeed requires totalSupply() + amount < MAX_FEED_SUPPLY, which at zero can never pass — so every mint path is closed.
The last Minted event on FEED was 2023-08-03. The last EggSwap was the final transaction of the exploit itself. No FEED has been created since.
These parameters are owner-settable. Minting is currently disabled — it is not mathematically impossible, and this site will say so automatically if that ever changes, because the flag is read from the contract on every index run.
The exploit explains most of the gap over the 12 billion design cap, but not all of it. We are not going to round that away.
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The residual is consistent with ordinary emissions overshooting a target the contract never enforced — MAX_FEED_SUPPLY was deployed at 32e27, so 12 billion was always a design figure rather than a chain-level limit.